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Abstract
The standard history of macroeconomics considers Lucas (1976)–
“the Lucas Critique”–as a path-breaking innovation for the discipline.
According to this view Lucas’s article dismissed the traditional macroe-
conometric practice calling for new ways of conceiving the quantita-
tive evaluation of economic policies. The Lucas Critique is consid-
ered, nowadays, as a fundamental principle of macroeconomic model-
ing (Woodford, 2003). The interpretation and the application of the
Critique, however, represent still unsolved issues in economics (Chari
et al., 2008). Even if the influence of Lucas’s contribution cannot be
neglected, something seems to be missing in the narrative: the reac-
tions of the economists that were directly targeted by the Critique.
Modeling practices of economic policy evaluation were not overthrown
immediately after Lucas (1976), creating a divide between theoretical
and applied macroeconomics (Brayton et al., 1997).
The purpose of this paper is to study the reactions of the macroe-
conometricians criticized by Lucas. We focus especially on those
macroeconometricians who worked on policy evaluation and who held
an expertise position in governmental institutions. We categorize the
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diﬀerent reactions to the Critique, in order to enrich the understand-
ing of the evolution of modeling and expertise practices through the
analysis of the debates–which have not yet been completely solved.
In the first section we propose a careful account of Lucas’s argu-
ment and of some of the previous works anticipating the substantial
outline of the Critique (like Frisch’s notion of autonomy). Second, we
bring our own interpretation of Lucas (1976). We think that we find
two points of view in Lucas paper : a prescriptive one that tell you
how to build a good macroeconometric model (it is the standard in-
terpretation of the article); a positive one that relies on the fact that
the Lucas critique could be seen as an attempt to explain a real-world
phenomenon, the stagflation. Third, we classify the reactions of the
Keynesian macroeconometricians following this line of interpretation.
On the prescriptive side, the Keynesians protested against the New
Classical solution to the Lucas critique (the use of the rational expec-
tation hypothesis among other things). Klein, for instance, proposed
an alternative microfoundational programme to study more empiri-
cally the formation of expectations. On the positive side, the Keyne-
sians put into question the relevance of the Lucas Critique to explain
the rise of both unemployment and inflation in the 1970s. They tried
to test the impact of policy regime changes and of shifts in agents be-
haviour. According to us, in general, the explanation of the stagflation
was elsewhere.
Keywords: History of macroeconomics, Keynesian economics, Lu-
cas Critique, Macroeconometrics, Rational Expectations.
JEL Code: B22, B41, E60.
2
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.59
[Lucas 1976] had an
extraordinary eﬀect. Practising
econometricians routinely make
a bow in the direction of the
“Lucas Critique” claiming either
that it does not apply to their
work or that they have taken
care of the diﬃculties raised by
Lucas. (Fischer, 1996, p.21)
Introduction
"Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique" (Lucas, 1976) represents
without any doubt one of the most famous papers in macroeconomics. This
paper is largely acknowledged as a turning point in the history of macroe-
conomic modeling and as a symbol of the disrupted period that the 1970s
were for macroeconomics. This disruptive character of the 1970s did not only
consist on the theoretical and methodological upheavals occurring inside the
discipline. Disruptions would also stem from the convoluted macroeconomic
context itself. During the 1970s, the inflation rate reached one of its high-
est levels in the United States, remaining always above 6 per cent (except
for 1971) and reaching two peaks (12% in December 1974 and more than
14% in March 1980). At the same time, the unemployment rate steadily
increased until it reached a peak following closely the inflation top (9% in
January 1975).1 Consequently, the Phillips Curve which had fitted so well
until the end of the 1960s, displaying a negative relation between inflation
and unemployment, became the major weakness of the Keynesian macroe-
conomic theory. In the data, the Phillips Curve seemed to have completely
disappeared.
In his 1976 paper, Lucas claimed that the traditional Keynesian macroe-
conometric approach - Lucas targeted the Klein and Goldberger (1955) model
- ignored that when economic policy changes, the structure of the relation-
ships between economic variables shifts due to changes in agents’ behavior
(notably due to changes in their expectations). This would invalidate econo-
metric inferences between past data and the forecasted eﬀects of a new policy
that is central to evaluate the impact of an economic policy.
Lucas’s paper is supposed to have had a terrific impact on the Keynesian
framework. For Preston Miller “the Lucas Critique was fatal and [so] new
1 Source: economic data of the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint-Louis.
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approaches had to be developed” (Miller, 1994, p.xv). Robert Hall underlined
the revolutionary nature of the argument when it came to the moment of
lauding Lucas’s work just after he was awarded the Nobel Prize:
The Lucas critique [...] has revolutionized the evaluation of policy,
down to the most practical level in central banks and finance ministries.
Policy evaluation procedures now routinely respect the dependence of
private decision rules on the government’s policy rule. [...] Work on
the Phillips Curve has been virtually abandoned, devastated by the
theoretical and empirical force of the critique. Builders of large-scale
models for the U.S. Federal Reserve and the IMF strive to address the
Lucas critique.
(Hall, 1996, p.38)
Contemporary macroeconomics considers Lucas (1976) as a cornerstone of
the discipline, as a fundamental problem one has to take into account in order
to construct a consistent model.2 Michael Woodford, in the introduction
of his book - which represents today the emblem of the “New Neoclassical
Synthesis” (Goodfriend and King, 1997) - describes the Lucas Critique as
one of the two basic justifications for building microfounded macroeconomic
models:
The development of a model of the monetary transmission mech-
anism with clear foundations in individual optimization is important,
in our view, for two reasons. One is that it allows us to evaluate alter-
native monetary policies in a way that avoids the flaw in policy evalu-
ation exercises using traditional Keynesian macroeconometric models
stressed by Lucas (1976).
(Woodford, 2003, p.13)
The history of macroeconomics, told by the macroeconomists themselves,
considers the Lucas Critique as a path-breaking innovation that immediately
dismissed the traditional macroeconometric practice by force of the argu-
ment. Such an account of history is fundamentally linear, and considers
macroeconomics as if it was only driven by scientific progress, as if it kept
moving towards a better understanding of economic phenomena, and as if it
was interspersed by breaking points. In this account of history, some articles
or books are erected as major historical events and are supposed to have
suddenly changed the way of doing macroeconomics.
2 Even if the routine building of macroeconomic models with explicit microfoundations
made the younger generation less aware of this legacy.
4
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.59
In the case of the Lucas Critique, the first flaw of this historiographical
approach is that one could be led to think that, thanks to Lucas, the problem
of ignoring the changes in structure had already been solved, and that mod-
els subject to the Lucas Critique have disappeared. Actually, strong debates
around the application of the Lucas Critique remain. Standard features of
contemporary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, as
long-term wage contracting (of the type suggested by Fischer, 1977) and the
Calvo index (Calvo, 1983) are constantly attacked in terms of their invari-
ance to policy changes.3 Moreover, the formulation of the Critique and the
proposition of a potential solution (the use of rational expectations) were not
enough to build models which were robust with the Lucas Critique. Far from
being an obvious issue, the realization and introduction of the Critique into
the practices of macroeconometricians was a long and complicated process -
as the building of the Liverpool model illustrates (Minford et al., 1984). De-
spite Hall’s statement quoted above, some macroeconomic models that are
not consistent with the Lucas Critique are still used today by institutions
that provide economic policy recommendations.4
The second flaw of this historiographical approach is that the standard
history of macroeconomics does not mention the reaction of the “victims” of
Lucas’s attack. And yet, these reactions definitively existed, and they were
stormy! The formulation of the Lucas Critique is then a controversy of the
classical form, characterized by an attack, and by some replies to this attack.
We think that the study of scientific controversies is fundamental to make
the history of the discipline and to understand current issues in macroeco-
nomics. And so, we believe that, in order to build a more accurate history
of macroeconomics, it is necessary to study the reactions of the Keynesian
macroeconometricians facing Lucas (1976).
The purpose of our article is to build a typology of the reactions of the
Keynesian macroeconometricians to the Lucas Critique in the years following
its publication. This typology relies on our interpretation of “Econometric
Policy Evaluation” both as a positive and as a prescriptive statement. We
think that this duality in Lucas’s paper, and then in the reactions to it,
3 The advanced textbook written by Minford and Peel (2002, chap. 6) gives a substantial
place to the former question (following Barro 1977a), while Duarte Duarte (2011, p.
396, fn. 7) discusses the latter.
4 We have not led yet a systematic inquiry of the considerations for the Critique in the
building of institutional macroeconomic models. But we know that the situation for
France is particularly interesting, since the French Treasury uses two types of models.
The MESANGE model which is rather a structural model with no explicit microfounda-
tions (and so subject to the Lucas Critique) and the EGEE model, which is a standard
DSGE model.
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enables to explain the success of Lucas’s 1976 paper. The common path of
interpretation is, of course, the prescriptive one: Lucas’s article represents
a methodological norm, a rule for modeling, a prescription for preventing
macroeconometricians from ignoring the reaction of agents facing economic
policies. Lucas (1976) can be interpreted as paving the way to avoid this
problem. We will show, however, that Lucas’s paper could also be interpreted
in a positive way, as an eﬀort to understanding the stagflation situation in
the U.S.5 In this case, changes in agents’ behavior would then provide an
explanation about the cause of a real world phenomenon. We think that
the reactions to Lucas (1976) can be better understood by enlightening the
Lucas Critique imbroglio, i.e. the ambiguity of that positive and prescriptive
statement. This interpretation allows us to adopt a broader point of view on
the reception of the Lucas Critique and a more structured overview of the
Keynesian replies.
To illustrate our argument, we have tried to build a large corpus, allowing
for the identification of the reactions in the ten years following the publica-
tion of “Econometric Policy Evaluation”. Our point of departure was the
systematic inquiry of Ericsson and Irons (1995). Their aim was to look at
the papers that tried to empirically test the validity of the Lucas Critique. In
order to do so, they built a database with all the articles citing Lucas (1976).
They used diﬀerent categories to classify the papers (is it a theoretical, an
empirical or a mixed contribution? Is the reference to Lucas substantial, tan-
gential or does the paper just postulate the validity of the Lucas Critique?).
With the typology of Ericsson and Irons, we have tried to select the most
promising papers that would allow us to find substantial discussions about
Lucas. We also searched for other sources of evidence in books (the research
of Ericsson and Irons only focused on journal articles) and also in interviews.
We looked at the proceedings of some macroeconomic conferences (for in-
stance, the “Rational expectations and economic policy” conference held at
the NBER in October 1978 or the conference held at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, in June 1978, called “After the Phillips Curve: Persistence
of High Inflation and High Unemployment”). There is no doubt that we have
missed some important elements and that our bibliography is far from being
exhaustive. We think that further research on proceedings could be very
fruitful, especially as it allows to study controversies in their most direct and
informal forms (notably through the “discussion” and “reply” sessions of the
conferences). Nevertheless, we consider that our typology is exhaustive, and
5 This is what Snowdon (2007, pp.547-548) called the “ideas hypothesis”, which states
that an inappropriate theoretical framework has led to bad economic policies that have
increased inflation.
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so, it is flexible enough to easily taking into account any new contribution.
The article is structured as follows. Section 1 proposes first a brief recall
about the formal content of Lucas (1976), and a discussion of this article as
a mainly prescriptive argument. We then place the Lucas Critique in rela-
tion to the history of econometrics, especially to Ragnar Frisch’s notion of
autonomy. We show here that the prescriptive side of the Lucas Critique
is nothing but a well-known problem in macroeconometric modeling. Sec-
tion 2 reconstructs the origins of the substantial argument of Lucas (1976)
in Lucas’s earlier writings. We find that the argument was already present
in earlier works, but that it was embedded within a mainly positive pro-
gram on the form of the Phillips Curve. We conclude that the originality
(and the success) of “Econometric Policy Evaluation” can be explained by
an imbroglio, an entanglement between a prescriptive and a positive side of
the argument. Section 3 synthesizes the reactions against the prescriptive
side of the Lucas Critique. We try to take into account the heterogeneous
eﬀorts for handling the problem emphasized by Lucas in an “innovative” way,
both by New Classical macroeconometrics and by other authors, especially
by Lawrence R. Klein. Section 4 presents the Lucas Critique as a contextual,
positive argument about the understanding of the 1970s stagflation. The
critical responses of macroeconometricians (like Alan Blinder, Lawrence R.
Klein or Otto Eckstein) about this positive side of the Critique are discussed.
Relying on our previous analysis, the conclusion provides some methodologi-
cal insights on the New Classical revolution in macroeconomics and proposes
some further lines of research.
1 The Lucas Critique: no new prescription un-
der the sun of macroeconometric modeling
In this section we first propose a comprehensive description of “Econo-
metric Policy Evaluation”; here, we emphasize the prescriptive dimension
of Lucas’s arguments. We intend to recall that the substantial prescriptive
contents of Lucas (1976) can be traced back to older debates among econo-
metricians, at the dawn of the discipline. Thus, from a historical point of
view, “Econometric Policy Evaluation”, in its mainly prescriptive dimension,
is not as path-breaking and not as original as claimed by the standard ac-
count in the history of macroeconomics. In other words, we show that the
problem tackled by Lucas (1976) had been previously emphasized by other
7
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authors, especially by Frisch in his own “critique” of Tinbergen’s work.6
1.1 What is the Lucas Critique?
“Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique” explicitly aims, first of all,
at criticizing, in a clearly “destructive” (Lucas, 1976, p. 41) perspective,
the mainstream econometric approach in macroeconomics (“the theory of
economic policy”), claiming that this approach “is in need of major revision.”
(ibid., p. 20).7 Lucas argued that he would possesses the main arguments
that provide the bases for such a revision.
The argument was directed against the possibility for traditional macroe-
conometric models to correctly state (or to quantitatively predict) the eﬀects
of alternative economic policies.8 Lucas introduced the problem in the fol-
lowing way:
These contentions [in “in the theory of economic policy”] will be
based not on deviations between estimated and “true” structure prior
to a policy change but on the deviation between the prior “true” struc-
ture and the “true” structure prevailing afterwards.
(Lucas, 1976, p. 20)
Model parameters estimated on past data, which are determined by a pre-
vious economic policy, are no longer correct if the economic policy changes:
in one word, a correctly specified model cannot include decision rules that
are invariant of the economic policies. The mechanism underlying the varia-
tion of parameters is the individual behavior (the rules governing individual
decisions), which take into account economic policies and so change along
with the policy regimes. Indeed, Lucas (1976) essentially consists on a pre-
scriptive statement about the way of modeling that would produce a sound
quantitative evaluation of the distinct eﬀects of alternative economic poli-
cies: it clearly states what modelers must avoid (considering the parameters
invariant with respect to changes in policies) and the alternative way to go
(taking into account the parameters drifts in response to changes in policies).
6 Aldrich (1989) has already made this point.
7 Lucas explicitly criticized Klein and Goldberger (1955) (Lucas, 1976, p. 19, fn. 2) and
Tinbergen (1952) (ibid., p. 21) and he did not address any direct critique to any model
that would be more recent than that.
8 Nevertheless, Lucas conceded that these models can generally forecast well in the short
run: “[...] I shall argue that the features which lead to success in short-term forecasting
are unrelated to quantitative policy evaluation, that the major econometric models are
(well) designed to perform the former task only [...]” (ibid., p. 20, Lucas’s emphasis).
8
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Lucas Critique is traditionally formalized as follows.9 Let st be a state
vector of all the relevant variables describing an economy at time t (con-
sumption, capital stock, etc.). The evolution of the system can be described
by the function f , which is fixed and not directly known:
st+1 = f [zt, st, ✏t] (1)
where zt is a vector of exogenous and arbitrary (non-stochastic) variables,
representing the “environment” of the economic agents, ✏t a vector of random
shocks (independent and identically distributed). The main interesting fea-
ture in the environment zt are obviously economic policy decisions. The
traditional econometric approach estimates f by pre-specifying a distribu-
tion function F and by estimating a vector of fixed behavioral parameters
✓:
st+1 = F [✓, zt, st, µt] (2)
Once equation (2) has been estimated, econometricians can simulate the
model for diﬀerent i paths of policies ({zi}t) and they can quantitatively
compare the diﬀerent situations (st+1| {zi}t).
Lucas criticizes this approach by pointing out the fact that the behav-
ioral parameters in the vector ✓ are not fixed (so, they are not invariant for
all {zi}t), but these behavioral parameters are a function of the individuals
optimizing decisions rules  , which reacts to changes in zt. This relation
between government decisions and individuals’ decisions can be written as:
  = G[st, zt] (3)
with G a known function. Then, the motion of the economy is actually
described by the relation
st+1 = F [✓( ), zt, st, µt] (4)
and the econometric problem is to formalize and to estimate the function
✓( ), which is then the “major revision” for which Lucas is calling for here.
According to Lucas, the specification of such a relationship must deal
with two questions (to which “Econometric Policy Evaluation” only alludes):
9 Lucas (1976) presents both a general discussion of this idea (sections 2 to 4, section 6),
which is detailed here, and three precise examples (sub-sections 5.1 to 5.3). The first
example discusses Friedman (1957) permanent income hypothesis, in a similar vein of
the discussion given by Muth (1960). The second example is borrowed from Lucas and
Prescott (1971). The third example, i.e. the specific application of the Lucas Critique
to the determination of the Phillips curve, is reported here in the Appendix.
9
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the description of the optimizing behavior of the economic agents and the
description of the way these agents form their expectations about the future.
According to Lucas, the former question is not problematic since economic
theory, and especially general equilibrium theory, would know how to deal
with it. On the contrary, the question about the formation of expectations
can be solved (i.e., ✓( ) can be specified and estimated), only if changes in
policies consist in changes in rules. In this case, one must use expectations
that are formed rationally in the sense of Muth (1961).10 Lucas precises that:
[this principle] does not attribute to agents unnatural powers of
instantly divining the true structure of policies aﬀecting them. More
modestly, it asserts that agents’ responses become predictable to out-
side observers only when there can be some confidence that agents and
observers share a common view [...]
(Lucas, 1976, p. 41)
The force of the perspective argument of “Econometric Policy Evaluation”
resides both in the criticism itself and in the explicit formulation of a new
principle for macroeconometric modeling activity.11
1.2 The Lucas Critique before Lucas
Lucas himself claimed that “there is little in this essay which is not im-
plicit (and perhaps to more discerning readers, explicit) in Friedman (1957),
Muth (1961) and, still earlier, in Knight (1921)” (Lucas 1976, p. 258) and
suggests to the reader to “see in particular Marschak’s discussion in Marschak
(1953) [...] and Tinbergen’s in Tinbergen (1956), especially his discussion of
qualitative policy” (ibid., fn. 3). The work of Friedman (1957) provided a
specific example for Lucas (1976, sect. 5.1.); Muth (1961) and Knight (1921)
provide theoretical inspiration for the solution of the Critique, especially in
terms of the specification of expectations (ibid., p. 41).
10 For recall, expectations are rational if the subjective probability distribution (the ex-
pectation of economic agents) equals the objective probability distribution. The ex-
pectation at time t  1 of the value of a variable x at time t equals then the expected
value of x, conditionally to the set of available past information ⌦t 1:
xet (t  1) = Et 1(xt|⌦t 1) (5)
A weaker form of rational expectations (which made explicit the stochastic character of
x) allows for an error term, so that expectations write xet (t  1) = Et 1(xt|⌦t 1) + µt.
µt is uncorrelated with ⌦t 1, so that there is neither perfect foresight nor systematic
bias in the information process.
11 The latter will be discussed in subsection 3.1.
10
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Marschak (1953) and Tinbergen (1956) constitute more interesting refer-
ences12, as they emphasized the problem from the perspective of economet-
ric practice and, more specifically, from the perspective of policy advising.
Although, even if econometricians were aware of the fundamental problem
raised later by Lucas, both Marschak and Tinbergen rejected the idea that
this problem would be relevant for macroeconometric modeling, i.e. they
rejected the problem from a prescriptive point of view.
Marschak, in his contribution to the 14th Cowles Commission Monograph,
addressed the problem of the useful knowledge that had to be produced by
economists/econometricians to help policy-makers “to make the best deci-
sions”. In this article, Marschak clearly stated the same kind of problems
emphasized later by Lucas:
In predicting the eﬀect of its decisions (policies) the government
thus has to take account of exogenous variables, whether controlled
by it (the decisions themselves, if they are exogenous variables) or
uncontrolled (e.g. weather), and of structural changes13, whether con-
trolled by it (the decisions themselves, if they change the structure) or
uncontrolled (e.g. sudden changes in people’s attitude).
(Marschak, 1953, p. 8)
Following Marschak’s understanding, changes in the structure are not
systematic. In particular, Marschak (Marschak, 1953, p. 25) suggested that
very few changes in policy-making could change the structure. In this case,
econometricians “just” need to derive the new structure after observation of
new data, the knowledge of the old structure and the knowledge of past
changes in the old structure being an essential informational source.
In his 1956 book Economic Policy: Principles and Design Tinbergen
also addressed the problem of producing valuable expertise for policy-makers
through econometric modeling. In Chapter 5 “Qualitative policy: changing
the structure within given foundation” (explicitly quoted in Lucas, 1976),
Tinbergen discussed the situation “in which the structure of the economy is
changed” (Tinbergen 1956, p. 149) as, for instance, through a change in the
“pricing scheme” (ibid., p. 161), which is exactly the same kind of example
used by Lucas in his “Econometric Policy Evaluation” (see the Appendix).
According to Tinbergen, shifts in the economic structure are “less frequent”
and “to be seen as long-term policies” (ibid., p. 149): these changes, however,
when eﬀective, call for a “methodological change” in the way of evaluating
alternative economic policies:
12 Haavelmo (1944, p. 27) also provides a similar point of view.
13 Here, changes in the form of economic relationships between variables.
11
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In principle this investigation [about qualitative policy] will mean
that each time a comparison is made between two states of the econ-
omy: the original state and the situation created by the structural
change considered. [...] Such an investigation will only be possible
if we know how the economy behaves in the new situation [...]. The
characteristics of quantitative policy, just discussed, make it somewhat
premature to deal with the problems of such policy in the way chosen
for the treatment of quantitative policy.
(Tinbergen, 1956, p. 151-153)
These prescriptive conclusions of Tinbergen about macroeconometric
modeling for policy evaluation had already been subject to harsh criticisms
long before Lucas, since the 1930s. In 1938, Ragnar Frisch wrote a review of
Tinbergen’s 1939 book Statistical Testing of Business-Cycle Theories, where
Frisch accused Tinbergen of not having discovered autonomous relations, but
coflux relations.14 Frisch provided indeed the first systematic exposition of
the econometric problem of structural invariance, which was emphasized by
Marschak, Tinbergen and, finally, Lucas. Moreover, one can claim that the
prescriptive side of the Lucas Critique is already explicit in “Frisch’s Critique”
of Tinbergen.
In his seminal contributions to the econometric research program (Frisch,
1933, 1934, 1938), Frisch clearly stated that econometrics would be concerned
with two alternative approaches. On the one hand, econometrics would be
concerned with the analysis of autonomous economic relationships that would
be discovered by means of structural estimation methods. This first approach
would provide the way of discovering the more “fundamental” equations that
would constitute the “essence of theory”. On the other hand, econometrics
would be concerned with the analysis of non-autonomous relationships, which
would consist on the confluence analysis method. This method of confluence
analysis would be concerned with the analysis of regressions where more than
one linear relation connects the variables in questions (Bjerkholt, 2005), i.e.,
when the degree of autonomy of the relations is very low. The distinction
between autonomous and non-autonomous economic relationships in Frisch’s
understanding has to be understood as a matter of degree. Some economic
relations can be more or less autonomous than other, and it is only those
with a higher degree of autonomy which would be invariant to economic
14 As Morgan (1990) explains, Tinbergen’s first volume was circulating in mimeographed
form in 1938 before its oﬃcial publication, and it was “evaluated at a special conference
in Cambridge (England) in July in that year”. Frisch could not attend to the conference,
but he sent his memorandum, which arrived after the event (ibid.). This memorandum
was published for the first time in Hendry and Morgan (1995).
12
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policy changes. Yet, these relations with higher degrees of autonomy are
more diﬃcult to be observed by the econometrician or economist.15
According to Frisch (1938), a system of equations (representing the eco-
nomic relationships) is an autonomous system if one equation (or its param-
eters) can change without causing any changes in the other equations of the
system (and in their parameters).16 Then, the main property implied by
Frisch’s definition of autonomy is that an autonomous system of equations
can be used for policy-simulation purposes. Autonomous systems would be
very diﬃcult to discover and to estimate according to Frisch. In the case of
Tinbergen’s macroeconometric modeling program, and in particular in the
case of Tinbergen (1939) League of Nations work, Frisch (1938) remained
pessimistic about the fact that Tinbergen was not dealing with autonomous
relations but with coflux relations. In a similar vein of Keynes (1939) criti-
cism to Tinbergen, Frisch (1938) clearly stated that “it is only coflux relations
that are determined by Tinbergen, and the lack of agreement between these
equations and those of pure theory cannot be taken as a refutation of the lat-
ter”.17 These coflux equations would be irreducible to the most fundamental
equations, since these would contain a minor degree of autonomy.
This brief account of the prescriptive side of the Lucas Critique shows that
the problem emphasized by Lucas was well known by most of the “founding
fathers” of the econometric program, and was explicitly discussed and for-
mulated. What is interesting, indeed, is that this fundamental problem was
put aside at some point, and forgotten especially by some econometric prac-
titioners in the subsequent decades.18 Then, the interesting question for the
reception of the “Econometric policy evaluation” is not so much about the
“path-breaking” or the “original” character of Lucas’s work; rather, it is about
the reasons that made possible to re-open the discussion about the invariance
of the structure of the macroeconometric models.
2 The Lucas Critique imbroglio
In the previous section we argued that the success of the “Lucas Critique”
cannot be rationalized as a prescriptive methodological advancement. Con-
versely, we consider here that this success within macroeconomics owes much
15 See Boumans (2010) for a detailed discussion of this problem.
16 See Aldrich (1989) for a formal account of the notion of autonomy.
17 Keynes (1939) main criticism was about the impossibility of testing economic theories
by means of econometrics.
18 For a comprehensive discussion of the disappearing of autonomy, see Qin (2014).
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to the ambiguity of Lucas’s paper. Indeed, Lucas’s paper is not restricted to
display the Critique in its narrow sense, but it appears as embedded within
two other proposals: the Rational Expectations Hypothesis, now REH (sec-
tion 2.1), and a positive explanation of the economic crisis of the 1970s
(section 2.2). This ambiguity is what we call the Lucas Critique imbroglio.
2.1 The Lucas Critique and its relation to REH
Strictly considered, the Lucas Critique implies that standard macro-
econometric models cannot potentially compare eﬀects of alternative policy
rules since the parameters are not deeply structural (i.e. policy invariant).
In essence, it is a negative result because it instructs how not to do macro-
econometric modeling. Thus, from a methodological point of view, the pur-
pose of the Lucas Critique is basically prescriptive. It raises an internal
criticism towards standard macro-econometric models, which can be reduced
to a “single syllogism” as Lucas pointed out at the very end of his article:
This essay has been devoted to an exposition and elaboration of a
single syllogism: given that structure of an econometric model consists
of optimal decision rules of economic agents, and that optimal deci-
sion rules vary systematically with changes in the structure of series
relevant to the decision maker, it follows that any change in policy will
systematically alter the structure of econometric models.
(Lucas 1976, p. 41)
Now, once the issue raised (or, recalled), the following step was to deter-
mine to what extent standard macro-econometric models were able to handle
with it. On that point, Lucas’s paper is still very moderate, and it just sug-
gests that the issue can be easily grasped. But, even if Lucas finally doubted
that his arguments would be grasped so easily, he indicated, in the end, that
it was just a matter of subjective appraisal.
These points are, I think, important, but their implications for the
future are unclear. After all, the major econometric models are still
in their first, highly successful, decade. No one, surely, expected the
initial parameterizations of these models to stand forever, even under
the most optimistic view of the stability of the unknown, underlying
structure. Perhaps the adaptive character of this early stage of macro-
economic forecasting is merely the initial groping for the true structure
which, however ignored in statistical theory, all practitioners knew to
be necessary. If so, the arguments of this paper are transitory debating
points, obsolete soon after they are written down. Personally, I would
not be sorry if this were the case, but I do not believe it is.
14
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.59
(Lucas 1976, p. 24, our emphasis)
And the way Lucas justified his own skepticism is, indeed, highly subjec-
tive. Basically, Lucas relied on his conviction that agents’ expectations are
nothing but rational, i.e. that they are neither static (Lucas 1976, p. 25)
nor adaptive in the long run (ibid., p. 26). Lucas firstly, and surreptitiously,
introduced Muth’s concept when he discussed the case of the consumption
function (ibid., p. 27). But he still referred a second time to this concept
in the section 6 (“Policy considerations”) where he claimed that a sluggish
change of ✓ is both false and misleading (ibid., p. 39) and that a stable ✓( )
can emerge only if “policy changes occur as fully discussed and understood
changes in rules”, which may be if rationally expected (ibid., p. 41). Thus,
despite the fact that the Lucas Critique does not inevitably imply the REH
(since it is a potential solution and not a necessary implication of the Cri-
tique), the association between the Critique and the REH is highly suggested
in this paper.
Though, the reason for such an association is not mysterious at all. It sim-
ply appeared natural to Lucas, who actually never disentangled his Critique
from his own research program based on REH. Indeed, from an analytical
as well as an historical point of view, we even claim that it is not possible
to disentangle the content of this article from Lucas’s previous works. In
order to capture this idea, we need to recall the genealogy of this article that
became to be quoted as “the Lucas Critique”.
Even if “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique” was published in
1976, Lucas actually had already completed this work three years before,
in early April 1973.19 The first draft of the paper was presented on April
20, 1973 at the University of Rochester, during one of the first Carnegie-
Rochester Conference on Public Policy. The main subject of that session
dealt with the Phillips Curve; Karl Brunner, as the organizer of the confer-
ence, had asked Lucas for “a survey of the empirical evidence on the Phillips
curve” (King 2003, p. 249). After some modifications on May 197320, Lu-
cas published this version of the paper as a Carnegie Mellon working paper
19 According to Sargent’s testimony: “On a Friday early in April 1973, I organized a small
conference on rational expectations at Ford Hall at the University of Minnesota. On
Saturday morning, I received a phone call from Rita Lucas relaying a request from Bob,
who was playing baseball, that I return to Ford Hall to search for an important folder
Bob had misplaced. I found a file containing a handwritten draft of ’Econometric Policy
Evaluation’ and mailed it to Bob”. (Sargent, 1996, p. 539, footnote 3, our emphasis).
20 In the acknowledgments for this second version (May 1973), Lucas thanks Edward
Prescott for his commentary during the Carnegie-Rochester conference, which brought
Lucas to substantially modifying his April 1973 first draft. For further analysis on the
variorum of “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique”, see Young (2014).
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(Lucas, 1973a). The 1973 working paper is essentially the same version as
the better known version of 1976, published in the Carnegie-Rochester Con-
ference on Public Policy proceedings (Lucas, 1976). Hence, the substantial
content of Lucas’s Critique was circulating since 1973, and it was even quoted
by some authors (Cooley and Prescott, 1976; Sargent, 1976). Thus, it is not
surprising that the intellectual genesis of the Lucas Critique can be easily
identified in Lucas’s previous works, especially in Lucas (1972a) and in Lu-
cas (1972b). These two contributions were written (very likely) just before
the first draft of Lucas (1976).
“Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” (Lucas, 1972b) is commonly
designated as the cornerstone of the New Classical macroeconomics and as
one of the most commented contributions by Lucas. Even Lucas himself con-
sidered it as his most influential work (Snowdon and Vane, 2005, p. 200).21
The main result of this model is that random changes in agent’s environment
(i.e. random changes in monetary policy, or “monetary surprise”) impact
agent’s behavior, and so the aggregates (i.e. the level of output), if and only
if these changes are not correctly anticipated by the agents. Here, despite
the fact that agents are maximizing their utility function and that they are
forming their expectations rationally (in Muth’s sense), changes in the envi-
ronment are not correctly anticipated because the information is incomplete.
Indeed, agents living in diﬀerent “island-markets” confuse variations in nom-
inal prices with variations in relative prices (the so-called “signal-extraction
problem”). Under this unique condition, the traditional Phillips curve is said
to hold; otherwise, only the “natural rate hypothesis” holds. There is no
doubt that the core of this model anticipates the substantial content of Lu-
cas (1976), in which a special emphasis is also made on the “Phillips curve”
(see the Appendix).
Furthermore, Lucas (1972a) article about “Econometric Testing of the
Natural Rate Hypothesis” suggests a new econometric research path for test-
ing these two alternative versions of the inflation-output relationship (the
standard Phillips curve and the “natural rate hypothesis”).22 Hence, Lucas
(1972a) is a logical step forward in respect of Lucas (1972b)23, since the
21 Although, in a bibliometric sense at least, “Econometric Policy Evaluation”, as well as
Lucas (1978) are far more quoted and commented (Andrada, 2014).
22 Lucas (1973b) is also concerned with the testing of the natural rate hypothesis across
a sample of countries.
23 As Lucas wrote himself, “my plan was to translate what I had learned from writing “Ex-
pectations and the Neutrality of Money” into linear examples that would make it clear
to a much wider readership why the standard tests for “long run” eﬀects [...] were not
informative about the Friedman-Phelps hypothesis. This paper became “Econometric
Testing of the Natural Rate Hypothesis”.” (Lucas, 2001, p. 21)
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econometric question is now brought to the fore. In this article, Lucas antic-
ipates more clearly the content of the Lucas Critique:
A once-and-for-all move to a new, fixed demand level implies a
change in the policy parameters [...]. This policy cannot be evalu-
ated by simply summing parameters implied by some previous, now
irrelevant policy.
(Lucas, 1972a, p. 99, Lucas’s emphasis)
So, it would be wrong to consider the Lucas Critique as being autonomous
from Lucas’s previous works, especially autonomous from Lucas (1972a) and
Lucas (1972b); or, even, from his wider eﬀort to build an alternative research
program in macroeconomics, based on the REH.24 Here is the first ambiguity
of Lucas (1976), namely to suggest (or to allow to assume) that the Lucas
Critique implies the REH, either as the cause or as the (unique) solution
for that issue. We saw above that such an association is present in Lucas
(1976) but still, knowing Lucas’s previous works, can legitimately stand for a
valuable interpretation of the Lucas Critique. From that perspective, it is no
surprise that most of commentators interpreted the REH as a consubstantial
part of the Lucas Critique. Even inside the New Classical macroeconomics
approach, the confusion is often made (see a.o. Turnovsky, 1984, Rossiter,
1985, Jung, 1986 and even Sargent, 1996).25 Now, let us turn to the second
ambiguity of Lucas (1976).
2.2 The Lucas Critique and its positive scope
In its narrow sense, the Lucas Critique implies that standard macro-
econometric modeling failed to compare the eﬀects of alternative policy rules
since it did not take into account the changes in the agents’ behavior in
24 The agenda of the New Classical Macroeconomics’s research program will be formu-
lated later, in its most clearly way by Lucas and Sargent (1979). Following other his-
torians of economic thought (Duarte and Lima, 2012; De Vroey, 2009; Vercelli, 1991;
Hoover, 1988), we analyze the Lucasian research program (then resumed by the label
“New Classical macroeconomics”) as an alternative scientific paradigm to “Keynesian
macroeconomics” in virtue of its several shifts: a shift in the object of macroeconomics
(from unemployment to business cycles); a shift in the way of conceiving expectations
(from backward-looking expectations to RE); a shift in the theoretical framework (from
a Marshallian to a Walrasian basis) and in the scope of the equilibrium concept (from
a static to an intertemporal equilibrium); then, a shift in the results on the eﬃciency
of economic policies. For a more extensive comparison, see De Vroey (2015).
25 Symptomatically, this latter stated: “the rational expectations critique of simulations
is attributed to Lucas (1976)” (Rossiter, 1985, p. 324).
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response to a change in economic policy. Again, “Econometric Policy Evalu-
ation” is primarily concerned with a prescriptive motive about how to provide
sound econometric policy evaluation, or how to improve it. It does not go
further than that. Lucas made the eﬀort of well defining the prescriptive
scope of his Critique of standard macro-econometric models - notably, the
Critique does not apply to short-term forecasting:
For the question of the short-term forecasting, [...] we have seen
that this conclusion is of only occasional significance. For issues in-
volving policy evaluation, in contrast, it is fundamental; for it implies
that comparisons of the eﬀects of alternative policy rules using current
macroeconometric models are invalid regardless of the performance of
these models over the sample period or in ex ante short-term forecast-
ing. The argument is, in part, destructive: the ability to forecast the
consequences of "arbitrary", unannounced sequences of policy deci-
sions, currently claimed (at least implicitly) by the theory of economic
policy, appears to be beyond the capability not only of the current-
generation models, but of conceivable future as well.
(Lucas, 1976, p. 41-42)
Now, once the major (or unique?) purpose of Lucas (1976) is recalled,
it appears weird to wonder about the positive scope of the Lucas Critique.
Though, regarding the economic context in the first years of the 1970s, there
is no doubt that Lucas was concerned about something more. In a nutshell,
while inflation and unemployment were constantly rising, the stabilization
policies turned out to be ineﬀective to counter a phenomenon (the so-called
“stagflation”) that seemed to refute the received Keynesian theoretical view
at the time - namely, the hypothesis of a trade-oﬀ between inflation and
unemployment based on the Phillips curve.
Though, and rather surprisingly, Lucas’s paper remains very distant from
current economic policy considerations. After some words in introduction
on stabilization policies and on the possibility to maintain permanently a
high rate of inflation to keep a low rate of unemployment (Lucas, 1976,
p. 19), no more mention is made of the economic context. No matter the
economic crisis in the 1970s, the stagflation and its plausible causes (like the
rising price of oil), Lucas’s paper is only concerned with the methodology
of macroeconometric modeling. The basic purpose is, though, to show that
this methodology is flawed. From here, it just takes one step to interpret the
Lucas Critique as aiming at making the Keynesian policy-advisers responsible
for stagflation (especially G. Ackley and A. Okun, presidents of the Council
of Economic Advisers in the late 1960s).26
26 Muchlinski (1999) still analyzed this issue.
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Actually, this step will be reinforced a few years later by Lucas, in a paper
co-written with Thomas Sargent (Lucas and Sargent, 1979) still famous for
its provocative words against the Keynesian paradigm. More substantially,
this paper provided the opportunity for Lucas to extend the scope of his
Critique in a more positive direction. Now, and combined with the claim
that Keynesian macro-econometric models lacked some clear and consistent
specification of the dynamic individual behavior, the Lucas Critique led to
accuse Keynesian models for having underestimated the role of optimizing
behavior and expectations when new economic policies were implemented.
From that perspective, according to Lucas and Sargent the early 1970s have
represented a key test for the relevance of Keynesian models:
A key element in all Keynesian models is a “tradeoﬀ” between in-
flation and real output: the higher is the inflation rate, the higher is
output (or equivalently, the lower is the rate of unemployment). For
example, the models of the late 1960s predicted a sustained unem-
ployment rate in the United States of 4 percent as consistent with a 4
percent annual rate of inflation. Many economists at that time urged a
deliberate policy of inflation on the basis of this prediction. Certainly
the erratic “fits and starts” character of actual U.S. policy in the 1970s
cannot be attributed to recommendations based on Keynesian models,
but the inflationary bias on average of monetary and fiscal policy in
this period should, according to all of these models, have produced the
lowest average unemployment rates for any decade since the 1940s. In
fact, as we know, they produced the highest unemployment since the
1930s. This was econometric failure on a grand scale.
(Lucas and Sargent, 1979, p.6)
As we can see above, even if Lucas and Sargent extended definitely the
Lucas Critique in a positive way, they also confined themselves to what we
call the “weak thesis”. Indeed, they refused to attribute the failure of 1970s
economic policies to Keynesian macroeconometric models. Their point is
surely to stress the failure of U.S. expansive fiscal and monetary policies and
of the inconsistencies of Keynesian models, but they do not let suppose that
these inconsistencies (in particular the mistaken reactions of the agents to
changes in economic policy) are (even, partly) responsible for the bad results
of the policies implemented in the early 1970s.27
27 Such an ambiguity can also be found about the policy-ineﬀectiveness proposition. De-
spite the fact that New-Classicals never tried to draw a clear cut between their theoret-
ical models and their normative conclusions (see, for instance, the claim of Sargent in
Klamer 1984, p.70), it is not a coincidence that some economists (for example, Tobin
(1981)) regarded the New-Classical Revolution as the second wave of a more general
Monetarist Revolution (on the legitimacy of such a link, see Hoover (1988), chapter 9).
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But here again, beyond the circumlocutions of Lucas and Sargent, it is
not surprising that a “strong thesis” has also been developed for giving an
extended positive scope to the Lucas Critique. This is even less surprising
if one consider, as we did in the first part of this section, the close rela-
tion between Lucas (1976) and the immediately preceding works of Lucas
about the neutrality of money (Lucas, 1972b,a). The stronger version of the
Lucas Critique thesis implies doing a step further in supposing that defec-
tive Keynesian models have amplified the economic troubles of the 1970s (in
particular the “great inflation”). Such an interpretation must has been suﬃ-
ciently wide-spread in macroeconomics to remain so intact after decades, so
that its clearest expression can be found in Snowdon (2007):
[T]here are several plausible explanations of the emergence of the
“Great Inflation”. One persuasive explanation is the “Idea Hypothe-
sis”. This hypothesis emphasis a number of policy errors that had their
origins in a mainstream acceptance of a defective Keynesian theoreti-
cal framework that encouraged monetary policy to become “unusually
prone to creating volatility during the late 1960s and the 1970s” (citing
Bernanke 2004). This framework downplayed the importance of infla-
tion relative to unemployment, neglected the influence of endogenously
determined inflationary expectations, displayed undue optimism about
the ability of policymakers to use both fiscal and monetary policy to
“fine-tune” the economy, gave too much weight to non-monetary forces
(cost-push shocks) as contributing factors to rising inflation while ne-
glecting the influence of monetary factors, and accepted unrealistically
low estimates of the sustainable (natural) rate of unemployment (citing
DeLong 1997, Orphanides 2003, Nelson 2005).
(Snowdon, 2007, p. 547)
At the end of this section, Lucas’s paper appears well as an imbroglio
since the Lucas Critique stricto sensu appears as not disentangled from two
other elements: on the one hand the REH and, on the other hand, a posi-
tive explanation of the economic crisis of the 1970s (which is closed to the
policy ineﬀectiveness proposition according to the “strong thesis”). From
that perspective, the diﬀusion of the “Lucas Critique” must be understood
as having been processed under this form of imbroglio (i.e. a whole pack-
age) so that the interpretation of Lucas (1976) has long been misleading in
macroeconomics, especially during the 1970s. At a first sight, Keynesians
themselves looked to be confused by it, by focusing their criticisms on the
REH or the policy-ineﬀectiveness proposition but never tackling the Lucas
Critique stricto sensu. Yet, such an impression is misealding. Indeed, most
of Keynesians acknwoledged the problem raised by Lucas as it really was,
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namely a long-standing issue in econometrics. Then, they simply rejected
the lucasian package in its prescritpive and positive form. In other words,
they were criticizing the REH as a solution for the prescriptive side of the
Lucas Critique (section 3) as well as its positive scope for explaining the eco-
nomic crisis of the 1970s (section 4). So reconsidered, Keynesian reactions to
Lucas (1976) must be then understand as an answer to the Lucas Critique
imbroglio.
3 Can we handle the Lucas Critique?
In this section, we try to synthesize the main ways to taking into account
the prescriptive side of the Lucas Critique. We explore first the New Classical
attempts to construct, following the Lucas Critique implications, a model-
ing strategy that could compete with traditional macroeconometric models.
Second, we discuss the Keynesian reactions to the New Classical solution,
that is to say the use of the REH. Third, we discuss Lawrence Klein work in
the 1970s and the 1980s as a “paradigmatic” example of dealing with Lucas
(1976) and proposing an alternative to the New Classical solution.
3.1 The New Classical way
In 1981, Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent edited Rational Expectations
and Econometric Practice. This volume collected 34 published and unpub-
lished articles by 17 diﬀerent authors, and, as the editors put it in their
introduction, the general purpose was to “oﬀer something to the economist
who wishes to apply the idea of rational expectations to problems of esti-
mation, testing, policy evaluation or control” (Lucas and Sargent 1981a, p.
xxxviii). The aim was then to sum up the empirical techniques as well as
their application and the subsequent findings of what we will call the New
Classical macro-econometrics (NCME).28 In our perspective, this volume is
an interesting synthesis of the econometrical and modeling eﬀort made by
those who “swore allegiance” to the Lucas Critique: in more plain terms,
those who recognized the prescriptive consistence and relevance of the Cri-
tique and accepted its implications, e.g. the rational expectations and the
general equilibrium approach.
The first purpose of the NCME can be seen as an “empirical” research
program. Indeed, NCME tried to work out empirical evidences against the
so-called “Keynesian” macroeconomics and in favor of the rational expecta-
tion hypothesis. The main issue was the econometric test of the Keynesian
28 For a comprehensive discussion about the NCME, see Sergi (2015).
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Phillips curve against the “natural rate hypothesis”. Basically, the empir-
ical side of NCME consisted in supporting the claim for money neutrality
on the short and long run (except in presence of monetary surprises). This
result consistent with the theoretical foundation of the rational expectation
hypothesis, as formulated first in Lucas (1972b). There, the Lucas Critique
was “packed” with a more general claim, especially about its implications (as
we already recalled in section 2.1), which were empirically tested.
The second purpose in the NCME program, in which we are interested
here, was “normative”. The aim was to construct an explicit set of rules for
building an estimated and complete model of the business cycle. Obviously,
such a model must follow the methodological and theoretical principles of the
New Classical macroeconomics (rational expectations, optimizing behavior,
dynamic general equilibrium); in the same time, it shall be able to reproduce
the main features of the actual business cycles and to forecast the eﬀects
of alternative economic policies. Consequently, those (conditional) forecasts
are supposed to be safe from the Lucas Critique point of view. In one word,
this second line of research of the NCME try to build a valuable alterna-
tive to the Keynesian macroeconometric models, which handled properly the
econometric problem raised in Lucas (1976).
The normative side of the NCME mainly relied on the idea of build-
ing estimated macroeconomic model providing an estimation of the optimal
dynamic decision rules and they, so-called, “deep” parameters (preferences,
technology) describing agents’ behavior face to particular economic environ-
ments and their changes. This way of modeling proceed in three levels:
first, by formulating, computing and estimating (with maximum likelihood
methods) the optimal dynamic decision rules for economic agents; second,
by specifying and estimating the form for stochastic processes in the econ-
omy; third, by testing cross-equation restrictions on the parameters of those
estimated equations.29 The cross-equation restrictions are supposed to in-
sure the consistence and the relationship between parameters, so that the
model will be robust to the Lucas Critique.30 The cross-equation restriction
approach was combined with time series analysis, especially in the wake of
the Granger’s definition of causality (Granger, 1969): this analysis helps the
modeler in establishing the exogeneity of parameters.31 Hansen and Sargent
29 This line of empirical research strictly follows Lucas (1972a)’s prescription.
30 Following the notation used in subsection 1.1, the general idea is to test the consistence
between estimated form of G and F ).
31 The NCME made as well an intensive use of both of these techniques for testing the
neutrality of money. The test in terms of Granger’s causality is more frequent in this
empirical side of the NCME: well known contributions in this vein are Sargent and
Wallace (1973) and Barro (1977b).
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(1981a) and his multi-variate version Hansen and Sargent (1981b) is the more
“achieved” example of such a model.
The dissemination in the field of macroeconomic expertise of the NCME
was quite limited. When we look, for instance, at the non-academic aﬃl-
iations of the authors contributing to Lucas and Sargent (1981b), we can
distinguish basically two types of institutions that are represented: the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and the NBER. All the leading fig-
ures of the NCME worked as consultants for the Minneapolis Fed (Sargent,
Prescott, Wallace, Sims); although, among the macroeconomists which had
contributed to the NCME more occasionally, we can quote Robert Hall, who
was at the time the Director of the “research program on economic fluctua-
tions and growth” of the NBER.
The reasons for such a modest success of NCME are, first of all, the tech-
nical (computational) obstacles to the estimation of such models (required by
the high number of restrictions to undertake tests simultaneously) as well as
identification and specification problems linked to highly non-linear forms of
decision rules, stochastic processes and cross-equation restrictions. We can
also suppose that another important constraint in the spreading of NCME
models relies on the complexity of the NCME models, in respect of the gen-
eral training level of macroeconomists at the time (in terms of mathematical
techniques on dynamic optimization).
Despite its weak institutional dissemination, the NCME approach had
also a very aggressive attitude in respect of the modeling practices of insti-
tutions. Three interesting examples are the article of three less known Min-
nesotans, Miller (1978), Anderson (1979) and Miller and Rolnick (1980). In
his contribution to the Symposium of The Journal of Business about econo-
metric forecasting, Miller exposed his optimistic view about the development
of NCME:
[...] [econometric methods] can [provide more accurate forecasts]
if the econometric restrictions in the models are derived from theo-
ries of individual optimizing behavior in an explicitly defined dynamic
stochastic setting. This is no longer a hope for the future. It is a cur-
rent reality. Sargent (1977b) has employed this methodology to a study
of the labor market. I believe this to be the first successful attempt
to derive restrictions across stochastic processes based on a model of
optimizing behavior. I believe Sargent’s approach is the right direction
for future modeling eﬀorts because it promises to produce restrictions
which will hold up over time and under policy interventions.
(Miller 1978, pp. 583-584)
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This confidence in the NCME approach made it possible to provide a
harsh attack on the modeling practices in other institutions. Anderson (1979)
provides a new version, of two main macroeconometric models used at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and at the Board of Governors 32 that
included rational expectations and cross-equation restrictions. In a similar
vein, Miller and Rolnick (1980) criticizes the models used by the Congres-
sional Budget Oﬃce (CBO):
[...] the CBO’s model, like all existing macroeconometric models,
is useless for policy analysis: it allows neither reliable prediction of
the economic eﬀects of alternative policies nor proper evaluation of
alternative economic outcomes. We argue that the CBO should adopt
a rational expectations, equilibrium approach in order to overcome
these diﬃculties.
(Miller and Rolnick 1980, p. 171-172)
The general claim made by Lucas and Sargent (1979) on the failure of
Keynesian macroeconometric models in providing sound expertise, as well
as the program of the NCME derived by from the Lucas Critique, stand as
quite academic through all the 1980s. Nevertheless, as the three examples
above have showed, there was an attempt of trying to spread the ambition of
providing an alternative to Keynesian macroeconometric models across other
institutions, where a new generation of macroeconometricians was relieving
the older generation. The Minneapolis Fed was the epicenter of such an
attempt. However, it does not mean that this attempt went without obstacles
and objections from the Keynesian faction.
3.2 Criticizing the rational expectations solution
While most Keynesians acknowledged the problem raised by the Lucas
Critique, they also refused to take for granted the REH as the unique valuable
solution. Besides, as this latter was firstly seen as the key feature leading to
the policy ineﬀectiveness proposition 33, it soon concentrated the major part
of angry reactions. The Keynesian opposition to the New Classical solution
32 The model used in the Fed was called the Fed-MIT-Penn model. He was construct
by the Federal Reserve Board jointly with Albert Ando and Franco Modigliani. See
Bodkin et al. (1991, p.110).
33 From that perspective, it is not a mere coincidence if the New Classical revolution was
first christened the "Rational Expectation revolution". It took then some years for the
majority of Keynesians to realize that it was possible to build models with rational
expectations where stabilization policies are useful and welfare improving.
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relied mostly on a realisticness basis. Rather illustrative is the reaction of
Franco Modigliani, who claimed (in his interview with Klamer) to reject the
REH because of its lack of realism:
See, what bothers me about rational expectations is that these
people are really pushing specific implications. If it is just a matter
of saying you have to take reactions to policies into account, I would
agree. Yes, policy measures can change the structure of the economy.
Modeling this will be very hard, but there is no objection of princi-
ple. [...] [M]y objection is not one of principles, but of applications.
[...] I find particularly objectionable the postulate that all rational
agents believe the quantity theory of money holds instantly, because
there is no reason in the world that that should be true. I tend to
believe very few people know what money means and what it does.
For example, I could imagine people are much more responsive to the
announcement of a tax reduction than to an announcement that tells
them at what rate money is growing. It may be that that has an eﬀect
on unemployment, but I do not think it means anything to people. So
the fundamental way to proceed in modeling, I think, is to take into
account the role of expectations in whatever way seems best and most
productive. I can think of situations where assuming that expecta-
tions are consistent with the model is a convenient way to start. But
we cannot base all our conclusions on that assumption.
(Klamer, 1984, p.125-126)
Such trial on unrealism was similarly undertaken by most Keynesians,
like a.o. Solow (1978) or Tobin (1981). Interestingly, those latter started to
react to the REH only after Lucas (1976) whereas this hypothesis was less
extensively developed in this paper than in Lucas (1972b). Hence, this focus
on the REH must be interpreted as a way to react to the Lucas Critique
in the following sense: if the problem raised by Lucas holds, the solution
he suggests makes no sense. Now, we need to note that the alternative
solutions proposed by Keynesians were not necessarily the same ones. In a
nutschell, while some of them were keepping to assume adaptive expectations
(like several monetarists), others were acknowledging the need to rely on a
more forward-looking concept of expectations. This is the line of research
of Keynesians like Katona (1980) but also Lawrence Klein. Besides, this
latter is the one who most reacted to the Lucas Critique and made eﬀorts to
develop alternative solutions to it. Considering in a first time that rational
expectations can be a sound way of treating the problem of expectations in
macroeconomic models, he finally rejected because it was asking too much
from the data, namely it "asks both to generate the expectations and [to]
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provide the model estimates with simulation" (Klein and Mariano, 1987,
p.442). Thus, according to him, the rational expectations approach would
entail an identification problem:
I think that for expectations–unless we get fresh information - we
have an identification problem. From an econometric point of view we
used to characterize the problem of using the same data to estimate
first the variance - covariance matrix of observation error and then
coeﬃcients based on these as eating one’s tail - to make the sample
try to do both things. I think that the people who want to use the
model to generate expectations and then estimate the model are also
eating their own tails. They are assuming that their methodology is
correct without validating that assumption. Many people seem to like
the procedure, but I think it faces a fundamental problem.
(Klein and Mariano, 1987, p.442)
The fundamental problem Klein was talking about would be a major
epistemological problem, since "[t]here is little attention paid to whether
[macroeconomists using this approach] are right or not" and the single thing
they would pay attention to is "only [...] the fact that it is a procedure that
makes expectations endogenous" (Klein and Mariano, 1987, p.442). But
Klein would go even further and would say that "[he] deplore[s] the will-
ingness [of these macroeconomists]to make very strong assumptions about
the way expectations are formed, simply for the sake of getting the rational
expectations approach as just a technical device to get elegant results, but
which presented serious methodological problems". Hence, the use of the
REH in macro-econometric models simply do not enable to lay the founda-
tions for a secure method in front of the Lucas Critique. Reversely, Klein
advocated for a more realistic approach in the modeling of expectations, in
order to understand how people really react to changes in economic policy
(following the line developped for years by Katona). However, his way of
treating expectations is inseparable from his wider research program that we
need, now, to explain at length.
Lawrence R. Klein carried a true alternative to the new classical approach,
developing a microfoundational program that Kevin Hoover labeled "aggre-
gation program" (Hoover, 2012). In this program, "each of the Keynesian
functions was analyzed at a microeconomic level and its implications for a fea-
sible macroeconometric model considered" (Hoover, 2012, p.41). Klein aimed
at "disaggregating" the macroeconomic model "as far as the data [would]
permit" (Hoover, 2012, p.51). And Klein’s way of treating the problem of
expectations is typical of this way of thinking. First of all, macroeconometri-
cians did not wait for the Lucas Critique to integrate expectation equations in
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the model. While the idea had emerged in Lucas’s work, Adams and Duggal
(1974) built an "Anticipation version" of the Wharton model - a model built
in part by Klein, following his former "PostWar quarterly model" (Klein,
1964). Adams and Duggal wanted to study the eﬀect of expectations on the
multiplier and used for that purpose three types of expectation variables: the
Michigan index of consumer sentiment, the BEA (Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis) Investment Anticipations and data on housing starts. These variables
were included in the model, "both as explanatory variables and with enough
additional equations to explain their formation" (Bodkin et al., 1991, p.127).
Even if the issue of expectations was not central for Klein in the 1970s
(as section 4 testifies)34, the problem raised by Lucas had to be taken into
consideration. Following the fact that "the rational expectations school has
raised some important questions about the dynamics of the macroeconomy"
(Bodkin et al., 1991, p.553), Klein brought some propositions to deal with
the formation of expectations and with the agents’ reaction face to changes in
economic policy. As underlined above, the opposition with the New Classical
school was rather methodological. Klein rejected the kind of instrumental-
ist philosophy conveyed by Lucas and his followers. It seemed more useful
for Klein "to estimate explicitly, rather than implicitly", the equation of
expectations formation. Klein was more interested in discovering the "ac-
tual" process behind the way agents would form their expectations. The key
element in this research area was the use of new microeconomic information:
In my opinion, the best way is to go to the source of expecta-
tions and find out what people actually expect or anticipate and to
endogenize that within the frame-work of models. That means that
we should integrate sampling investigations on subjective expectations
together with market and accounting data for the economy and treat
that as one big system with the subjective expressions of expectations
as endogenous variables. I think that is a very straightforward proce-
dure, and one that will prove to be the best. This approach will have
true informational content because we will be trying to model people’s
stated expectations in a realistic way. We must take account of the
life of these expectations. In fact, it is rather short, and that means
we have to have repeated subjective observations. I find the European
business test surveys, the surveys of consumers, the various surveys
34 Klein acknowledged the importance of expectations in macroeconomic modeling: "I
think expectations are very important and I think that the model builders have rec-
ognized it from day one" (Klein and Mariano, 1987, p.419). But he considered that
the disturbances of the 1970s raised the issue of the modeling of the supply side in
macroeconomic models. Macroeconomists had to tackle the modeling of the energy
and raw materials sectors.
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of inflation, the statistics on orders, the statistics on housing starts,
and all the things we call anticipations variables to be very important.
They need to be integrated directly into the models.
(Klein and Mariano, 1987, pp.419-420)
It is clear that Klein advocated for a "bottom-up" line of research. Mi-
croeconomic surveys enable to see how agents look at macroeconomic vari-
ables and what their expectations for these variables are. With this amount
of data, you can try to find some fundamental equations that describe the
behavior of agents, and then understand how they react to economic pol-
icy. This approach clearly represents an alternative to the New Classical
way of modeling expectations. However, as Hoover (2012) puts it, the major
problem with this approach relies on the aggregation issue. Does it exist a re-
liable method to aggregate all these subjective data on agents’ expectations?
The "representative agent microfoundational program" of the New Classical
School is a way to avoid the question directly confronting Klein’s approach.
Perhaps this is why Klein’s proposal did not seem to have found its way in
the academic world. The alternative propositions to the NCME, concerning
the Lucas Critique, seem to be rather scarce at that time. In fact, the de-
bates were focusing on the empirical question hidden behind Lucas (1976):
do expectations and bad economic policies explain the disturbances of the
1970s?
4 The "positive way" to criticize the Lucas Cri-
tique
As we claimed in section 2, the common contemporary interpretation of
Lucas (1976) is a “prescriptive” one: the Lucas Critique is presented as a
principle that must be taken into account in order to avoid the inconsis-
tency of macroeconomic models designed for policy evaluation. But it also
represents an attempt to explain the stagflation period by the failure of Key-
nesian econometric policy evaluation (the “ideas hypothesis”, as Snowdon,
2007 labels it). In this section, we will see how the Lucas Critique received a
positive interpretation, as a contextual, positive attempt to explain why bad
economic policies had thrown the United States economy into stagflation.
Indeed we analysis how Lucas (1976) has led to an empirical dispute. We
consider that the debate around the interpretation of stagflation provides a
broader frame for understanding the reactions of Keynesian macroeconome-
tricians face to the Lucas Critique. The empirical refutations of the Lucas
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Critique belongs to a larger issue: finding how to explain what was happen-
ing during the 1970s. The Keynesians general perspective was also to defend
the performance of the standard macroeconometric models in the 1970s, and
to set up their research agenda for the years to come.
4.1 Refuting the Lucas Critique: The Phillips Curve is
still very much alive
Alan Blinder is emblematic of this way to address the problem.35 In his
reply to the Lucas Critique (Blinder, 1987, 1988)36, Blinder adopted a much
wider point of view: he casted doubt on the legitimacy of the New Classical
Revolution. While, in the 1980s, the vast majority of the young economists
did not declare themselves "Keynesians" anymore, Blinder was wondering
if this scientific change had occurred for good epistemological reasons. Ac-
cording to him, this was obviously not the case, since the New Classical
Revolution was a theoretical revolution without any empirical grounds:
A scientist from another discipline might naturally surmise that
the data of the 1970s had delivered a stunning and unequivocal re-
jection of the Keynesian paradigm. He would look for some decisive
observation or experiment that did to Keynes what the orbit of Mer-
cury did to Newton. But he would look in vain. [...] [T]here was
no anomaly, (...) the ascendancy of new classicism in academia was
instead a triumph of a priori theorizing over empiricism, of intellec-
tual aesthetics over observation and, in some measure, of conservative
ideology over liberalism.
(Blinder, 1988, p. 278)
According to Blinder, New Classical macroeconomics proposed no rele-
vant explanation of stagflation. Actually, New Classical macroeconomists
just took advantage of the temporary empirical invalidation encountered by
the Keynesian theory. Blinder thought that the success of the Lucas Critique
was the result of a bad inference, following the assessment of this invalidation:
35 At that time, Blinder was at Princeton and Research Associate of the NBER. In 1975,
he was Deputy Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO). No doubt
that he knew well the CBO’s model criticized by Miller and Rolnick (1980), as explained
above.
36 The empirical refutation of Blinder was already there–but in a very crude way–in his
book on stagflation (Blinder, 1979, p. 92).
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Academic readers of Lucas put two and two together and jumped
like lemmings to the wrong conclusion. The facts were (a) that infla-
tion rose and (b) that the correlation between inflation and unemploy-
ment changed. The (untested) assertion was that the Lucas critique
explained why (b) followed from (a): the government had adopted a
more inflationary policy. (Blinder, 1988, p.283)
(Blinder, 1988, p. 283)
After the first oil shock in October 1973, the empirical relation between
inflation and unemployment disappeared, and New Classical insights gained
in popularity in the academic sphere. In its criticizing of the Phillips relation,
the Lucas critique seemed to be indirectly validated as it oﬀered a theoretical
justification for the disappearance of the Phillips curve.
Alan Blinder strongly rose up against that use of the Lucas Critique.
Acknowledging the failure of the Phillips curve to correctly describing the
new 1970s situation, Blinder stated that Keynesian economics reacted very
promptly in adding new features (like oil prices) that allowed for a better
fit of the Phillips curve with data (Blinder, 1987, p. 133).37 At the same
time, Blinder claimed that there was no proof whatsoever that the Phillips
curve disappearance was the consequence of a change in the agents’ economic
behaviour, and he tried to prove econometrically the opposite case:
It was remarkable how uncritically the Lucas critique was accepted.
Had governments really decided to ’ride up’ the Phillips curve toward
higher inflation, as Lucas claimed, or had they simply encountered bad
luck from the supply side? The former was assumed even though the
latter seems clearly to have been the dominant factor quantitatively.
Did the more inflationary environment shift the distributed lag a(L)?
Rather than seek evidence on this point, partisans of the Lucas cri-
tique became econometric nihilists. Theory, not data, was supposed
to answer such questions; and theory allegedly said yes.
[...] There is no evidence for a shift in the lag coeﬃcients A(L).
And that, in turn, suggests that the breakdown of the old-fashioned
Phillips curve cannot be attributed to the reason emphasized by Lucas.
(Blinder, 1988, p. 278)
The New Classicals’ behavior was anti-empirical and the Lucas Critique
soon became a kind of leitmotiv to attack Keynesian models.38 Blinder ac-
knowledged that the Critique may be true and that the modeler has to be
37 Blanchard (1984) proposed an econometric test in the same vein, backing the claim
that the traditional Phillips curve is still empirically relevant.
38 This anti-empirical nature of the Lucas Critique was already put forward in 1984 by
Blinder in an interview with Arjo Klamer: “All you have to do in this country (...)
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careful. But, if one wants to work in a scientific way, one has to check if
changes in agents’ economic behavior have a true and substantial eﬀect on
the relation one is studying. Stanley Fischer defended the same point when
he claimed:
It is indeed remarkable that the Lucas policy evaluation critique
has triumphed without any detailed empirical support beyond Lucas’s
accusation that macroeconometric models in the 1960s all predicted
too little inflation for the 1970s. The general [theoretical] point made
by the critique is correct and was known before it was so eloquently and
forcefully propounded by Lucas. That the point has been important
empirically, however, is something that should have been demonstrated
rather than asserted.
(Fischer, 1983, p. 271)
Without such an empirical verification - that has to be done for every
studied relation - the popularity of the Lucas argument is not justified. Ac-
cording to Blinder, casting doubt on the Lucas Critique is important es-
pecially as it leads to a “back to basics” movement (Blinder, 1988, p.285)
which promoted strong rationality as an a priori condition to model agents’
behavior.
4.2 Keynesian Models do actually explain Stagflation
Alan Blinder was not the only econometrician reacting against the Lucas
Critique in this way. A part of Klein’s response relies on the defense of the
prediction power of Keynesian macroeconometric models during the 1970s
and on the refusal to considering expectations as the major determinant of
the unexpected inflation. In a paper written in 1976, Klein “showed that the
Wharton model, if given a conventional fiscal shock, would generate the usual
trade-oﬀ relationship, but if given a food or fuel price shock would generate a
situation of rising unemployment and rising inflation” (Klein, 1985, p. 293).39
right now is scream mindlessly, “Lucas critique!” and the conversation ends. That is
a terrible attitude. The Lucas critique may be correct, but I have seen no persuasive
evidence in any sphere to indicate that it is empirically important. The empirical case
is yet to be made” (Klamer, 1984, p. 166).
39 We did not succeed in grabbing the 1976 paper cited by Klein. In Klein (1985), he
quoted it in this terms: “Klein, Lawrence R. “The Longevity of Economic Theory”,
Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung, H. Albach et al. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1977,
411- 19. This paper was read to E. Malinvaud’s seminar in Paris, November, 1976”.
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This assertion is at odds with Lucas’s argument on the impossibility of
evaluating economic policies by means of econometric models. Large-scale
macroeconometric models à la Klein, many of which had “Phillips curves
as structural equations of the labor market” (Klein, 1985), were capable of
realistically simulating the eﬀects of an economic policy, as well as the unex-
pected eﬀects of price shocks. This point brings the debate to the question on
the originating source of the 1970s inflation to the question whether economic
policy caused inflation (Lucas’s position) or whether inflation was rather the
result of price shocks (Klein’s position).
According to Klein, “inflation was not policy induced”, or at least, it
was “certainly not [induced] from the policies that were coming from the
neoclassical-Keynesian model”. Inflation “was purely exaggerated by the food
and oil shocks” (Klein, 1985, p.291). Taking price shocks as a valid (though
partial) explanation of the inflationary surge of the 1970s, large-scale macroe-
conometric models would stand the test of their simulation capacities. They
would prove useful in simulating not only the eﬀects of a particular economic
policy, but also the eﬀects of an external shock to the system.
Consequently, modeling the energy and raw materials sectors, instead of
introducing expectations to the models, was at the top of the research agenda
according to Klein. He explained that until the 1970s “[m]any people failed
to realize how important energy or oil, in particular, was for the economy
because it represented only a tiny share of total GNP” (Klein, 1985, p. 290).
This neglecting of the energy (and food) sector constituted the source of the
underestimation of the inflation rate in the forecasts of the Wharton model.
Once the macroeconometric models introduced the energy and the agricul-
tural sectors, by the mid-1970s, econometricians “were able to overcome a
lack of information from [these] area[s] of economic activity” (Klein, 1985, p.
292). This new available information allowed econometricians to build “an
amplified model that was able to handle the inflation problem more realisti-
cally by mid-1975, when inflation was still strong”, which yielded a moderate
forecast error (Klein, 1985, p. 292).
To strenghten his claim, Klein used the work of Otto Eckstein (1978,
1983), one of the co-founders of the DRI model in 1969, who tried to assess
the relevant determinants of the crisis and the validity of the rational ex-
pectations hypothesis. Using the DRI model, Eckstein (1978) had studied
the impacts of six major shocks on the rate of unemployment and inflation.
He showed that the major causes of the stagflation were, in order, “the En-
ergy Crisis (the major contributor, according to Eckstein’s analysis, to both
observed inflation and unemployment and hence highly stagflationary), the
Agricultural Price Explosion, monetary policies [...], the devaluation of the
dollar, price decontrol (for inflation) or price controls (for unemployment),
32
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.59
and fiscal policies, 1969-74 (the least important for inflation and, in a sense,
for unemployment)” (Bodkin et al., 1991, p. 126). Few years later, Eckstein
led some new tests and drew a clear general conclusion : “[C]hanges in policy
regime seem to have been among the minor sources of structural change of
the economy and of forecasting error in the actual historical record” (Eck-
stein, 1983, pp.xi-xii). The empirical work of Eckstein was clearly aiming at
discrediting the use of the Lucas Critique argument to explain the rise both
in inflation and unemployment.
In his conclusion to the conference held at the Federal Bank of Boston,
"After the Phillips Curve: Persistence of High Inflation and High Unem-
ployment,"40 Solow seemed to sum up well the Keynesian empirical position.
Even if he acknowledged that “there is a very valuable and important point
which is in very large part due to Lucas and Sargent, and one must give
them credit for it, that what often looks casually like a change in structure is
really the economic system reacting to its own past” (Solow, 1978, p. 205).
According to Solow, the true challenge of stagflation was elsewhere. Instead
of throwing out the baby with the bath water, macroeconometricians should
improve the models by emphasizing the supply side of the economy, more
precisely by emphasizing “the side of food, oil, nonfuel minerals, and the
depreciation of the dollar” (Solow, 1978, p.205).
This section suggested some examples of macroeconometricians reactions
face to the positive side of the Lucas Critique, i.e. its interpretation of
stagflation in the 1970s. The claim of this section was to clarify how those
reactions focused, on the one hand, in providing empirical evidences against
Lucas Critique implications and, on the other hand, in constructing a reli-
able explanation of the stagflation within the traditional macroeconometric
modeling approach.
Concluding remarks
Our paper suggested an exhaustive typology for building an ordered com-
prehension of the heterogeneous reactions of Keynesian macroeconometri-
cians against Lucas (1976), providing some examples to illustrate the useful-
ness of this classification. Our claim is that a deep understanding of the topic
of the response to the Lucas Critique must be based on the appraisal of the
Lucas imbroglio, which means that readers of the Lucas Critique should be
aware of the fact that “Econometric Policy Evaluation” made a (con)fusion
40 It is the conference where Lucas and Sargent has presented their warlike paper, “After
Keynesian Macroeconomics” (Lucas and Sargent, 1979).
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between two registers: the prescriptive interpretation and the positive ac-
count of the Lucas Critique. The prescriptive interpretation implies a general
principle for building consistent macroeconometric models, providing sound
economic policy analysis. We insisted on the fact that this level of the ar-
gument was not new for econometricians, and that it is nothing more than
a revival of Frisch’s critique of Tinbergen’s work for the League of Nations,
following Frisch’s concept of autonomy. The positive account of the Lucas
Critique is strongly related to the discussion of the U.S. stagflation in the
1970s and to the issue of the invalidation of the Phillips Curve. In the same
register, the rational expectations approach and the policy ineﬀectiveness of
the macroeconometric models implied by the Critique were also a part of the
prescriptive/positive “package” leading to the Lucas imbroglio. We claimed
that this imbroglio can be regarded as a main reason of the disruptive impact
of Lucas (1976). Attracted by the stagflation issue and the policy ineﬀective-
ness proposition, Keynesian macroeconometricians rarely answered directly
to the Lucas Critique stricto sensu and seemed to dodge the problem.
Our opinion is that further researches in the recent history of macroe-
conomics can bring two important developments about the issues discussed
in this paper. The first one is, obviously, a more deeper and detailed ac-
count of some specific points (e.g. the alternative program of Klein, or the
debates about the stagflation), which implies to explore more exhaustively
the existent literature.
Another line of research should take a closer look to the inner reasons of
the Lucas imbroglio. Indeed, the disruptive character of Lucas’s contribution
must be closely interpreted as a methodological and as an epistemological
turn in the history of the discipline, especially in its conception of the role of
models and in their relation (and “mediation”) with theory and with the em-
pirical world. Actually, following the insights of Lucas (their “methodological
spokesperson”), New Classical macroeconomists support what we could call
an aprioristic and instrumentalist view of modeling. Their models must be
built including some a priori assumptions (optimization in a general equilib-
rium framework, rational expectations) especially to escape from the Lucas
Critique.41 These two hypotheses are aprioristic since they are non-realistic
and supposed to be non-testable (in an instrumentalist perspective, only their
predictions should be tested), and so they are non-refutable. On the other
hand, these same models must provide some empirical (econometric) corrob-
41 Note that the a priori assumptions are also justified by their consistence with the
general methods of economics (Lucas, 1977): indeed, they should be regarded as the
only sound “microfoundations” for macroeconomics. This is, however, far to be so, as
we recalled in the case of Klein (section 3) and as is discussed in Hoover (2012).
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oration of their results (by reproducing past data or by producing forecasts),
to prove that the a priori hypotheses are valid instruments for prediction (or
retrodiction). This general methodological view can be easily interpreted as
the very underlying principle of the imbroglio between prescriptive and pos-
itive statements. The weakness of this conception is that a paradox arises
when the model results are not empirically verified, while the hypotheses
underlying the results cannot be rejected.42
The aprioristic bias of the New Classical methodology is, of course, barely
understandable from a “Keynesian” macroeconometric perspective. In the
case of the Keynesian models, a priori hypotheses were also necessary and
even very important as sources of information that would enrich the models
(Klein, 1960). The nature of these a priori hypotheses, however, completely
diﬀered from that of New Classical modelers, since the latter would not em-
phasize at all on the importance of the “realisticness” of these hypotheses,
while in the case of the Keynesian macroeconometricians, like Klein, the “re-
alisticness” of the a priori hypotheses was just fundamental.43 Moreover, the
work of Klein testified of the wish to build more empirical microfoundations
to macroeconomic models. The later does not have to rely on a priori mi-
croeconomic propositions and must be disaggregated in function of the data
you own.
New Classical macroeconomics deeply challenge the modeling practices in
this perspective, which, we suggest, is largely responsible for the controversial
reception of the Lucas Critique. Moreover, the understanding of this topic
can also enlighten the slow dissemination of New Classical macroeconomic
models in policy-making institutions. To put it clearly, the radical change
in the way of providing econometric policy evaluation, advocated by Lucas
(1976), did not take place until the very recent years, with the rise of the
DSGEmodels as a spread practice within central banks, even if, as we recalled
in the introduction, the DSGE models are far from being well-established.
For all these reasons, we can definitely aﬃrm that the responses to the
Lucas Critique are an underestimated part of the history of macroeconomics.
And hence, a more careful study of these responses and reactions might
actually bring about a deeper understanding of the evolution and current
state of the discipline of macroeconomics.
42 For a more comprehensive discussion about this topic, see Sergi (2015).
43 Fore a more comprehensive discussion of this topic, especially in Klein’s early work on
econometrics, see Pinzón-Fuchs (2014).
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Appendix
The traditional Phillips curve (Samuelson and Solow, 1960) suggests an
explicit relationship between the wage-inflation rate  ww and the level of un-
employment U , of the kind44:
 w
w
= ↵U z +   (1)
with ↵,   and z fixed parameters. In this framework, monetary policies
have a real eﬀect in setting the rate of unemployment through the manipu-
lation of the inflation rate. Econometric estimations of this relationship aim
at inferring the numerical value of the parameters from observed paths of Ut
and wt.
Lucas (1976) suggests that the actual relation between output and in-
flation must be described by specifying the optimization behavior of the
individuals and their expectations.45 Lucas wants to demonstrate that the
parameter ↵ is not fixed or stable, and that it will change following changes
in the environment, especially following changes in monetary policy.
The economy is characterized by N markets. The production in each
market i at time t, 8i = 1...N , is determined by a permanent and a transitory
component:
yi,t = yi,t + eyi,t (2)
The transitory component eyi,t is supposed to be a linear function of the
deviation between actual and perceived relative prices on the market i:
eyi,t =  (pi,t   pei,t) (3)
The price level on the market i, which is actually observed by agents, is
determined by:
pi,t = pt + zi,t (4)
with pt a variable, common to all markets and zi,t a random disturbance
(normally distributed, with mean 0 and variance ⌧ 2, independent from the
distribution of pt), representing the relative price variations across time and
markets. The distribution of pt is regarded by agents, on the basis of past
information, as following a mean pt and a variance  2). The two components
of pi,t cannot be observed separately by the agents. The real general level
44 For a history of diﬀerent specifications of the Phillips Curve, see Qin (2011).
45 The example presented here is inspired by Lucas (1976)’s section 5.3, but is obviously
the core of the well-known model in (Lucas, 1972b).
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of prices is simply described as the average across the N markets of the i
particular prices:
1/N
NX
i=1
pi,t = pt + 1/N
NX
i=1
zi,t (5)
For an N that is large enough, in order for it to converge to its mean, we
can assume that the general price level in the economy is the average of the
particular prices of each market.
Agents in each market are supposed to determine their supply following
their expectations pei , t, which are rational in the sense of Muth (1961):
pet = E(pt|pi,t, It 1) = (1  ✓)pi,t + ✓pt (6)
with ✓ = ⌧2 2+⌧2 .
Then, the cyclical component of the aggregate production is written aseyi,t = ✓ (pi,t   pt) and global production is:
yi,t = yi,t + ✓ (pi,t   pt) (7)
Following the above equation, the cyclical variation of the level of output
directly depends on the spread between the actual price level in a specific
market i and the anticipated global price level pt. As the expectations are
rational, we can easily conclude that any variation in the distribution of
general price level modifies the output. According to Lucas, if we suppose
that the general price level follows a random walk:
pt = pt 1 + ✏t (8)
with ✏t ⇠ (µ,  2). Then, the output can be written as
yi,t = yi,t + ✓ (pt   pt 1) + ✓ µ (9)
Under the condition of a stability in parameters ✓,  , an observable
(econometrically estimable) stability of this relationship is guaranteed. But,
if the values of these parameters change, for instance due to a change in
monetary policy (or otherwise, a change in the distribution of pt), then the
relationship is not valuable for simulation of alternative policies anymore.
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